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1 
Governance in the Public Corporation of the 
Future:  The Battle for Control of  
Corporate Governance 
Z. Jill Barclift* 
Eight years after passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 
Congress has again passed sweeping legislation in response to a 
corporate crisis.1  In addition to changes in the regulatory 
environment for Wall Street financial firms and banks, the Dodd-
Frank Act (D-F Act) also proposes reforms to corporate 
governance.2  Before passage of the D-F Act, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) began rulemaking on several 
governance matters addressed by Congress in the D-F Act; 
however, the SEC will begin rulemaking on many of the new 
corporate governance mandates over the next six to twelve 
months.3  As federal securities laws and rulemakings continue to 
define corporate governance requirements, the new rules raise 
anew a discussion of what is (or perhaps what should be) the 
balance between state corporate law and federal securities laws 
in regulating corporate governance for public corporations.4 
As Congress, the SEC, and national exchanges continue to 
develop rulemaking on director independence, compliance 
processes, disclosures, and leadership structure, any concerns 
over further intrusion of federal securities laws into state 
 
 * Z. Jill Barclift, Associate Professor of Law, Hamline University School of 
Law. 
 1 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). 
 2 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 3 Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Sec., Ins., and Inv., 112th Cong. 6–8 (2011) 
(statement of Mary Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission), 
available at http://banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View& 
FileStore_id=d1bd7e59-137a-4d00-93d0-8ede516f52a0. 
 4 Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 592 (2003) 
(discussing the race to the bottom in corporate law, and how the “federal authorities set 
the broad boundaries—of an uncertain and changing demarcation—within which the 
states can move”); Richard A. Booth, The Emerging Conflict Between Federal Securities 
Law and State Corporation Law, 12 J. CORP. L. 73, 74 (1986) (discussing the “implication 
of the dependence of the federal law of disclosure upon the state law of fiduciary duty is 
that when state law changes, so will federal law”); Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, 
Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of Corporate Law, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1573, 1575 
(2005) (discussing the relation between federal and state corporate lawmaking). 
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corporate governance are perhaps moot as the proverbial “camel’s 
nose” has already penetrated the tent.5  Even federalists have 
begun to accept that not only does Congress have the right to 
regulate public corporations, but also that it will do so when 
investors lobby for federal rules to address fraud or other 
governance failures.6  However, notwithstanding federal efforts 
to impose additional governance mandates, most corporate 
governance covering the relationship between shareholders and 
management remains firmly within the purview of state 
corporate law.7  Perhaps, the more narrow issue then becomes 
not whether we are headed toward a federal system of 
governance for public companies, but whether the intrusion by 
federal securities laws into state governance matters are 
beneficial to shareholders. 
In this Article, I examine the latest governance mandates 
under the D-F Act.  In particular, this Article focuses on the 
disclosure requirements on the CEO and chairman positions, and 
argues that disclosures of whether the CEO is also the chairman 
benefit shareholders’ governance rights under state law.  The 
new provisions under the D-F Act combined with recent SEC 
disclosure rulemaking on board leadership structure address a 
fundamental issue of board decision-making and the affects of 
structural bias and “group think” on director behavior.  
Bifurcation disclosures for public companies provide 
shareholders with beneficial information on board leadership 
structure, but more importantly, the disclosure requirements 
force directors to engage in discussion and analysis of how board 
decisions are made, and whether such decisions can be unduly 
influenced by a dominant CEO.  State fiduciary duty 
requirements do not directly address social and structural 
decision-making biases.  Shareholders benefit when federal 
disclosure rules address state governance shortcomings that are 
not otherwise conducive to private ordering. 
Part I of this Article explains the complimentary 
relationship between federal and state law, and looks at how 
securities laws focus on disclosure and state laws focus on 
fiduciary duties to protect shareholders from management 
misconduct.  This part looks at how Congress and the SEC use 
 
 5 Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Short Life and Resurrection of SEC Rule 19C-4, 69 
WASH. U. L.Q. 565, 620 (1991); Z. Jill Barclift, Codes of Ethics and State Fiduciary Duties: 
Where is the Line?, 1 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 237, 258 (2008). 
 6 Leo E. Strine, Jr., Breaking the Corporate Governance Logjam in Washington: 
Some Constructive Thoughts on a Responsible Path Forward, 63 BUS. LAW. 1079, 1084 
(2008). 
 7 Id. at 1081. 
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federal disclosure mandates to affect behavioral changes in board 
and management conduct. 
Part II examines recent efforts by the SEC to influence board 
and management governance prior to the passage of the D-F Act.  
This part looks at 2010 SEC rulemaking on risk, compensation, 
and governance; focusing specifically on the governance 
rulemaking on disclosure requirements for the CEO and 
chairman positions.  This part discusses the rationale for the 
rulemaking to address leadership and structural biases in board 
decision-making, and why board structure influences board 
decision-making. 
Part II also explores briefly the provisions of the D-F Act 
related to corporate governance and looks at which provisions 
use disclosure to effect corporate governance changes.  While this 
part briefly identifies and explains other corporate governance 
provisions in the D-F Act, the focus is on the provisions of the D-
F Act that provide Congressional support of the SEC’s efforts to 
influence board leadership and structural bias by examining the 
legislative history of the bifurcation provisions in the Act.  
Part III explores the meaning of structural bias and group-
think.  This part examines the social nature of boards, how such 
influences affect leadership structure, and why federal 
bifurcation rules may benefit shareholders. 
Part IV explores Delaware’s approach to structural bias and 
group-think in board decision-making.  This part looks at the 
difficulty shareholders face in trying to demonstrate the 
governance harm when directors’ decision-making is influenced 
by group-think and CEO dominance.  This part argues that 
federal disclosures on bifurcation forces directors to assess its 
leadership structure for structural biases and that the D-F Act’s 
and the SEC’s disclosure mandates benefit shareholders. 
I.  THE COMPLIMENTARY RELATIONSHIP:  FEDERAL AND STATE 
CORPORATE LAW 
The relationship between federal securities laws and state 
corporate law is best described as synergistic and 
complimentary.8  Federal securities laws and regulations, with 
their emphasis on public disclosures and financial reporting, are 
complimentary to state law’s focus on the relationships between 
shareholders and corporate managers, and the fiduciary 
obligations of the board.9  Recognizing the complimentary order 
 
 8 Id. at 1080–81. 
 9 Id.; Sean J. Griffith & Myron T. Steele, On Corporate Law Federalism: 
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of federal and state law, Congress has been careful not to intrude 
into areas reserved for state governance while carving out 
disclosure rules, which enables shareholders to make informed 
decisions.10  The D-F Act provides an example of how Congress 
balances disclosure with state fiduciary obligations of directors.  
Language in the D-F Act on non-binding shareholders’ vote on 
executive compensation specifically provides a rule of 
construction in which the non-binding shareholders’ vote does not 
overrule a decision by the board, create or imply a change to 
fiduciary duties, or create additional fiduciary duties for 
directors.11 
Notwithstanding the complimentary relationship of state 
and federal rules, the D-F Act and recent SEC rulemaking 
continue to demonstrate the effective use of disclosure rules to 
influence corporate governance.12  Corporate governance 
requirements remain within states’ regulatory purview and 
Delaware remains the dominant state for public company 
incorporation.13  However, it is the truce between federal 
securities laws and Delaware corporate law, which continues to 
illustrate how governance, in particular fiduciary duties, 
develops in response to Congress’ desire to act in the face of 
corporate crises.14  History suggests that Congress acts in 
response to public pressures for reform.15  Correspondingly, 
Delaware reacts by either amending its corporate laws or further 
defining fiduciary obligations of directors.16  As Leo Strine writes, 
“why the American model of corporate governance has served 
investors so well is the synergies that arise from the combination 
of a strong regulatory structure governing public disclosures and 
 
Threatening the Thaumatrope, 61 BUS. LAW. 1, 3–4 (2005) (discussing the origins of 
corporate governance federalism). 
 10 E. Norman Veasey, State-Federal Tension in Corporate Governance and the 
Professional Responsibilities of Advisors, 28 J. CORP. L. 441, 443–44 (2003) (discussing 
how federal law, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, does not completely supplant state law); 
Griffith & Steele, supra note 9, at 4. 
 11 Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance, COVINGTON & BURLING  
LLP, 2 (July 21, 2010), http://www.cov.com/files/Publication/0fd9af21-04a7-4537-9d8e-
bbc47050e295/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/e413a276-e87e-4af5-ac29-
bfebc5f100ec/Dodd-Frank%20Act%20%20Executive%20Compensation%20and% 
20Corporate%20Governance.pdf.  
 12 Robert B. Thompson, Corporate Federalism in the Administrative State: The SEC’s 
Discretion to Move the Line Between the State and Federal Realms of Corporate 
Governance, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1143, 1180–83 (2007). 
 13 Mark J. Roe, Is Delaware’s Corporate Law Too Big to Fail?, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 75, 
76–77 (2008) (discussing Delaware’s dominance in corporate law, including explanations 
for its dominance). 
 14 Id. at 82 (discussing how Congress’ response to corporate crises affects Delaware 
law rather than the law of other states due to its dominance in corporate law). 
 15 Id. at 83. 
 16 Id. 
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financial integrity, and a more nimble and enabling state law 
approach to the relations between corporate managers and 
stockholders.”17 
Yet, as Congress and the SEC continue to respond to 
investor concerns over management misconduct and board 
failures, new regulations and rules requiring disclosures on 
governance processes directly impact governance matters 
traditionally covered by state law.18  Recent SEC rules and the 
governance provisions in the D-F Act continue to use disclosure 
as the way to compel boards to implement changes to their 
governance processes.19  Before describing the D-F Act’s 
governance provisions, it is necessary to examine rulemaking on 
governance by the SEC enacted prior to passage of the D-F Act 
and what effect the D-F Act may have on the SEC’s rulemaking. 
II.  SEC RULES ON ENHANCED DISCLOSURE ABOUT RISK, 
COMPENSATION AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE  
Prior to passage of the D-F Act, effective in February 2010, 
the SEC implemented rulemaking covering board risk 
assessment, executive compensation, and corporate governance.20  
The new rules require disclosure of a company’s compensation 
policies and risk management; disclosure on the experience, 
qualifications, attributes or skills of the director; disclosures 
about each director’s experience at other public companies, 
including involvement in any legal proceedings; disclosure of how 
diversity is considered in the director nomination process; 
disclosure information about the role of the board’s oversight of 
risk and leadership structure, including whether the company 
has combined or separated the chairman and CEO position, and 
why the company believes this structure is appropriate; quicker 
shareholder voting results; revisions to disclosure on director 
compensation; and disclosure about compensation consultants 
including fees paid to the consultant.21 
The SEC’s stated goal in adopting the new rules was to 
improve information in annual reports and proxy statements to 
give shareholders improved information to evaluate board 
leadership.22  The D-F Act gave Congressional approval to many 
 
 17 Strine, supra note 6, at 1080. 
 18 Thompson, supra note 12, at 1180. 
 19 See generally Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-
9089; 34-62275 (Dec. 16, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2009/ 
33-9089.pdf. 
 20 Id. at 39–45. 
 21 Id. at 29–45. 
 22 Id. at 4. 
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of the rulemaking provisions put forth in the SEC’s rulemaking 
on proxy disclosure enhancements.23  It is therefore unclear what 
adjustments the SEC must make to its prior rulemaking in order 
to satisfy the requirements under the D-F Act or whether there 
will be additional disclosure requirements.  Although the D-F Act 
addressed systemic risk issues for the financial system, the SEC, 
as part of its 2010 rulemaking, issued rules to address the 
board’s role in monitoring systemic risk.24 
A. SEC’s Disclosure on Risk Management and New 
Compensation Committee Rules 
The SEC mandated that companies disclose the board’s role 
in risk oversight, and whether such policies “are reasonably 
likely to have a material adverse effect on the company.”25  The 
new rules require companies to disclose and evaluate their 
compensation policies and practices for all employees (including 
non-executive officers) and assess whether there are any risks 
associated with those compensation policies and practices.26  The 
purpose of the disclosure is to assist investors in determining 
whether a company has compensation incentives, which may lead 
to aggressive risk-taking by employees.27  
The types of examples provided by the SEC for disclosure 
include: design of compensation policies and practices for 
employees whose behavior is most affected by compensation 
incentives and how such policies may relate to risk taking by the 
employees; how the company considers risk assessment in 
designing compensation incentives; explanation of how the 
company’s compensation policies and practices may lead to risk 
taking by employees in both the short term and long term; any 
policies or changes to such policies regarding changes to 
compensation practices to adjust to risk profiles; and procedures 
to monitor risk policies and practices to determine whether its 
risk objectives are being met.28  
These disclosures will require boards to inform shareholders 
how they monitor the level of risk taken by not just corporate 
executives, but all employees.29  Boards will be better able to 
identify and address risky decisions by the chief executive, which 
 
 23 Alert SEC Disclosure and Corporate Governance, WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP, 
4 (Apr. 4, 2011), http://www.weil.com/files/upload/Weil_Alert_SEC_CG_April_4_2011.pdf. 
 24 Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, supra note 19, at 1. 
 25 Id. at 5. 
 26 Id. at 8. 
 27 Id. at 9. 
 28 Id. at 15–16. 
 29 Id. at 8–9. 
Do Not Delete 12/7/2011 2:17 PM 
2011] The Battle for Control of Corporate Governance 7 
may be driven by the CEO’s compensation goals rather than the 
best interest of the corporation.30  Improved risk management 
disclosures complement state fiduciary law by reinforcing good 
faith deliberations by the board.31  Knowing that shareholders 
will be looking at its disclosures to see if the board’s risk policies 
reward executives who take excessive risk with excessive 
compensation, directors will be careful to consider management 
decisions and engage in more open discord concerning 
management strategies.32 
The combined new disclosures on compensation committee 
independence, executive compensation and risk management 
disclosures, and disclosures on the separation of CEO and 
chairman positions directly address issues of structural biases in 
board decision-making.  The D-F Act provided Congressional 
approval of the SEC’s rulemaking on board leadership 
structure.33  The SEC’s rationale for implementing bifurcation 
rules are explained below.  
B. SEC Rulemaking on Board Leadership Structure 
Under the SEC’s rulemaking, companies are required to 
disclose why it has chosen to combine the positions of chairman 
and CEO and the reasons why the company believes this board 
leadership structure is appropriate for the company.34  If the 
company combines the roles, but selects an independent lead 
director to chair meetings of independent directors, then the 
company must disclose why it has a lead director and the role the 
lead independent director plays in leadership of the company.35  
The disclosures are not intended to influence a company’s 
leadership structure decisions; however, the purpose is to inform 
investors of the management’s explanation for its board 
leadership structure, and to provide insight into the board’s 
communication and the degree to which the board is able to 
exercise independent judgment about management.36 
The SEC’s rulemaking on governance remains within the 
traditional boundary of disclosure and financial integrity for 
federal rules.  The disclosure function of the new bifurcation rule 
is consistent with recent federal efforts to influence director 
 
 30 Id. at 9. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. at 14. 
 33 Id. at 39. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. at 81 (discussing the benefits of the new disclosure about board leadership 
structure and the board’s role in risk oversight). 
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behavior by mandating disclosures, notwithstanding the SEC’s 
insistence that it did not intend to influence leadership structure 
decisions by the board.37 
In response to investor concerns to perceived governance 
failures, the D-F Act includes several provisions to address 
governance lapses and enhance disclosure obligations of boards.38  
Congress’ stated goals in passing legislation to further 
governance enhancements are to address the perceived failures 
of corporate governance in monitoring risk management and the 
governance failures.39  The D-F Act provisions covering overall 
corporate governance is addressed below. 
C. Dodd-Frank Act:  Governance Provisions 
The pertinent section of the D-F Act concerning corporate 
governance is Title IX, Subtitles E and G.40  The provisions give 
shareholders proxy access by requiring a shareholder’s vote to 
approve executive compensation, disclosure on executive 
compensation and financial performance of the company and 
recovery of erroneously awarded compensation; disclosure on 
director and employee hedging; call for rules on independence of 
compensation committee members and their consultants; and 
disclosure on bifurcation of chairman and chief executive officer 
positions.41  Below are synopses of each governance provision and 
its stated goal in improving governance for shareholders.  
D. Proxy Access:  “Say on Pay” 
Among the more talked about governance provisions are the 
so-called “say on pay” requirements.42  The D-F Act authorizes 
the SEC to issue non-binding rules for shareholders’ voting on 
executive compensation by giving shareholders greater 
 
 37 Josh Wright, Stephen Bainbridge on Mandatory Disclosure: A Behavioral 
Analysis, TRUTH ON THE MARKET (Dec. 7, 2010), http://truthonthemarket.com/ 
2010/12/07/stephen-bainbridge-on-mandatory-disclosure-a-behavioral-analysis/ (discuss-
ing how “mandatory disclosure is a—maybe the—defining characteristic of U.S. securities 
regulation”);; Thompson, supra note 12, at 1181–82 (discussing that if shareholder access 
rules were implemented, the federalism issue would likely disappear); Z. Jill Barclift, 
supra note 5, at 250 (discussing how federal securities law regulates disclosure). 
 38 Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, supra note 19, at 42. 
 39 CCH ATTORNEY-EDITOR STAFF, DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND 
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT: LAW, EXPLANATION AND ANALYSIS 420–21 (Aspen Pub. 
2010). 
 40 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203, 
§§ 951-57, 971-79, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899-1907, 1915-26 (2010) (to be codified in scattered 
sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 41 Id. 
 42 Lucian A. Bebchuk, & Scott Hirst, Private Ordering and the Proxy Access Debate, 
65 BUS. LAW. 329 (Harv. L. & Econ. Discussion Paper No. 653, 2010), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1513408 (discussing proxy access). 
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participation in executive compensation decisions.43  
Shareholders are given an advisory vote on executive 
compensation; however, shareholders are not permitted to 
micromanage executive compensation by setting limits and are 
limited to the right to express an opinion.44  The purpose of the 
vote is to give shareholders information on compensation 
practices so that shareholders can evaluate whether such 
practices are in the shareholders’ best interests.45  Among the 
concerns expressed by Congress in passing these provisions was 
the desire to increase transparency and accountability, and to 
reinforce executive performance by rewarding short-term gain 
without penalizing for long-term consequences of decisions.46 
The disclosures on pay versus performance require the SEC 
to develop proxy rules that provide an explanation of 
compensation and include information showing the connection 
between executive compensation paid and company 
performance.47  Additionally, information on total median 
compensation of all employees, annual total compensation of the 
CEO, and a ratio comparing the CEOs total compensation to the 
median compensation of all employees must be disclosed.48  The 
purpose of these disclosures is to improve the information 
provided to shareholders so that investors are informed about the 
relationship between executive pay and performance and can 
make comparisons with overall medians and assess what 
executives are being paid when the company’s performance is 
failing.49  The SEC addressed some of these enhanced 
compensation disclosure requirements in rulemaking effective 
February 2010 and will likely issue additional rulemaking to 
comply with the D-F Act requirements.50 
 
 43 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 951-57; CCH 
ATTORNEY-EDITOR STAFF, supra note 39, at 420–23. 
 44 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 951; CCH 
ATTORNEY-EDITOR STAFF, supra note 39, at 421–23. 
 45 CCH ATTORNEY-EDITOR STAFF, supra note 39, at 421–22 (“Shareholders have 
raised concerns about large bonus plans in situation which they, as the company’s owners 
have experienced loss.”). 
 46 S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 133–34 (2010). 
 47 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 971; CCH 
ATTORNEY-EDITOR STAFF, supra note 39, at 430–31. 
 48 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 953; S. REP. NO. 
111-176, at 135. 
 49 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 953; S. REP. NO. 
111-176, at 135. 
 50 Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, supra note 19, at 1 (discussing that the 
amendments to these rules enhance the “information provided in connection with proxy 
solicitations and in other reports filed with the Commission”).  The SEC issued a press 
release in January, 2011 adopting rules for Say-on-Pay and Golden Parachute 
Compensation in compliance with Dodd-Frank Act. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n, SEC Adopts Rule on Say on Pay and Golden Parachute Compensation as 
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E. Executive Compensation:  “Claw Backs” 
The D-F Act imposes a requirement that public companies 
develop and disclose policies that, in the event the company is 
required to prepare an accounting restatement resulting from 
material noncompliance with financial reporting requirements, 
the company will recover from the executive officer any incentive 
compensation received.51  Congress’ intent was to require 
companies to recover executive compensation received due to lack 
of compliance with applicable reporting requirements so that 
shareholders would not have to resort to costly litigation to 
recover erroneously paid compensation.52 
F. Disclosures on Hedging 
The disclosures on hedging by employees and directors 
require shareholders to receive information in any annual proxy 
solicitation on whether employees or directors are permitted to 
purchase hedging financial instruments.53  The purpose of this 
disclosure is so that investors know whether employees or 
directors have hedged any compensation granted to them in the 
event the company fails to meet its financial targets.54 
G. Independent Compensation Committee 
Another noteworthy provision in the Act is the independence 
requirements for compensation committee members and 
consultants.55  The legislative history of the D-F Act suggests 
that Congress was not only concerned with disclosure, but also 
equally concerned with corporate governance processes.56  
Mandating the independence of key committees is not a new 
approach by Congress to deal with board decision-making; 
Congress, the SEC, and Exchange Act rules require independent 
audit committees and set forth parameters defining the meaning 
 
Required under Dodd-Frank Act (Jan. 25, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/ 
press/2011/2011-25.htm. 
 51 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 954; S. REP. NO. 
111-176, at 135–36.  
 52 S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 135–36.  “It has become apparent that a significant 
concern of shareholders is the relationship between executive pay and the company’s 
financial performance for the benefit of shareholders.” Id. at 135. 
 53 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 955; CCH 
ATTORNEY-EDITOR STAFF, supra note 39, at 427.  
 54 CCH ATTORNEY-EDITOR STAFF, supra note 39, at 427.  
 55 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 952; CCH 
ATTORNEY-EDITOR STAFF, supra note 39, at 423–25.  “Independence” is not defined in the 
legislation, but rather that determination is left to the exchanges and associations. Id. at 
423. 
 56 S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 137.  
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of “independent.”57  Similarly, the new requirements for 
independent directors on the compensation committee are 
consistent with prior federal governance rules on board 
committee structures.58 
The D-F Act mandates that members of the compensation 
committee be independent board members.59  The D-F Act leaves 
to the SEC the requirement of issuing rules for the national 
exchanges to prohibit listing companies that do not meet the 
compensation committee independence requirements.60  The 
exchanges must consider certain factors when defining 
independence, including the source of the director’s compensation 
and the director’s affiliation with the company.61  Additionally, 
compensation consultants to directors must also meet 
independence requirements.62  The SEC must issue rules on the 
meaning of independence of compensation consultants, which 
must be considered by compensation committees before engaging 
the advisory services of consultants.63  Factors in determining the 
independence of compensation committee consultants include 
whether the consultant provides other services to the company, 
the amount of fees paid to the consultant and the percentage of 
the consultant’s total revenue from these fees, any business or 
personal relationships of the consultant to the company, policies 
and procedures for hiring consultants, and stock of the company 
owned by the consultant.64  
The D-F Act also directs that a company give its 
compensation committee sole discretion to retain or to obtain 
advice from the consultant.65  The company must also disclose 
whether it retained a consultant and whether there are “any 
conflict[s] of interest[,] and, if so, the nature of the conflict of 
 
 57 15 U.S.C. § 78f (2010); Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, supra note 19, at 34–35 
(discussing standards relating to Listed Company Audit Committee). 
 58 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 952; CCH 
ATTORNEY-EDITOR STAFF, supra note 39, at 423–25.  
 59 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 952; CCH 
ATTORNEY-EDITOR STAFF, supra note 39, at 423.  
 60 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 952; CCH 
ATTORNEY-EDITOR STAFF, supra note 39, at 425.  
 61 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection, Act § 952; CCH 
ATTORNEY-EDITOR STAFF, supra note 39, at 423.  
 62 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 952; CCH 
ATTORNEY-EDITOR STAFF, supra note 39, at 424.  
 63 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 952; CCH 
ATTORNEY-EDITOR STAFF, supra note 39, at 424.  
 64 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 952; CCH 
ATTORNEY-EDITOR STAFF, supra note 39, at 424.  
 65 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 952; CCH 
ATTORNEY-EDITOR STAFF, supra note 39, at 424.  
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interest.”66  The mandates for independent compensation 
committee members and rules on hiring and disclosure of 
compensation consultants are to provide investors with adequate 
information to assess the reliability of compensation committee 
reports.67  Some of the legislative concerns over consultants have 
been addressed in earlier SEC rulemaking on compensation 
committee members’ independence, and the SEC may modify or 
tweak its previously issued rules on compensation committee 
director independence to meet the requirements under the D-F 
Act.68 
H. Disclosures on Bifurcation of CEO and Chairman Positions 
The D-F Act requires the SEC to develop rules that require 
disclosure in annual proxy statements, which state the reasons 
why a company has chosen the same person to serve as chairman 
of the board of directors and CEO or why it has chosen different 
individuals in these positions.69  The legislative history suggests 
that Congress understood there were valid reasons for having the 
same person serve as Chairman and CEO, yet recognized the 
importance of independent board leadership.70  The SEC issued 
rulemaking on board leadership structure calling for disclosures 
on CEO and chairman roles, therefore additional SEC 
rulemaking may not be required to comply with D-F Act.71 
All of the D-F Act’s governance requirements cover 
governance areas traditionally left to federal securities laws—
proxy rules, independent board members, and disclosure 
requirements.72  What makes the federal rules on disclosing 
bifurcations in board leadership new is that, unlike rules for 
independent audit or compensation committee members, board 
leadership structure rules address the social and psychological 
reasons behind board decision-making.73  It seems almost 
impossible not to disclose information on board leadership 
structure without the board first engaging in a discussion about 
 
 66 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 952; CCH 
ATTORNEY-EDITOR STAFF, supra note 39, at 424. 
 67 CCH ATTORNEY-EDITOR STAFF, supra note 39, at 424. 
 68 Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, supra note 19, at 47. 
 69 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 972; S. REP. NO. 
111-176, at 147. 
 70 S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 147. 
 71 Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, supra note 19, at 39–45 (discussing proposed 
amendments and final rules on new disclosure about board leadership and the board’s 
role in risk and oversight). 
 72 Holly J. Gregory, Corporate Governance—United States, WEIL.COM (last visited 
Mar. 23, 2011), http://www.weil.com/news/pubdetail.aspx?pub=4049. 
 73 Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, supra note 19, at 39 (requiring companies to 
disclose the reasons behind their choice of structure). 
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what is the most appropriate structure to encourage frank and 
open dialogue among directors.  The SEC has designed rules, 
which give investors information on the inherent or the 
structural design of board membership, so that shareholders will 
know whether a dominant CEO or leader has exerted undue 
influence on board decision-making.74  The influences Congress 
and the SEC seek to address are known as structural biases in 
decision-making by directors and the inability of boards to 
minimize the negative consequences of group-think.  Part III 
examines the meaning of structural bias and group think. 
III.  STRUCTURAL BIAS AND THE SOCIAL NATURE OF BOARDS 
Social science research documents that cohesive groups, such 
as boards, tend to engage in “group think” behavior and strongly 
identify with the group leader.75  A dominant leader can often 
manipulate the group to comply with his wishes.76  Directors thus 
often conform to the social norms of “group think” and limit frank 
discussion or dissent.77  Governance processes to counter the 
effects of “group think” include not only independent directors, 
but removing the CEO as chairman or selecting an independent 
director to lead discussions with other independent directors 
without the influence of the CEO.78  Boards engage in group 
think when there is limited discussion of ideas and few directors 
are willing to engage in critical analysis of ideas put forth by 
management.79 
Rakesh Khurana, a noted leadership development scholar, 
and Katharina Pick, a Ph.D. candidate, in their article, The 
Social Nature of Boards, outline the challenges faced by boards 
as groups subject to influence by charismatic leaders.80  Professor 
Khurana and Pick note the difficulty individual members of a 
group face in trying to stand up to leaders and why social norms 
of conformity often lead the board to acquiesce to the wishes of 
 
 74 Id. at 42–44. 
 75 See generally Marleen A. O’Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of Groupthink, 
71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1233 (2003).  
 76 Donald C. Langevoort, Resetting the Corporate Thermostat: Lessons from the 
Recent Financial Scandals About Self-Deception, Deceiving Others and the Design of 
Internal Controls, 93 GEO. L.J. 285, 297–300 (2004) (discussing the duration of CEO 
power and how it is obtained). 
 77 Id. at 295. 
 78 Id. at 313–14. 
 79 Troy A. Paredes, Too Much Pay, Too Much Deference: Behavioral Corporate 
Finance, CEOs, and Corporate Governance, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 673, 724–25 (2005); 
O’Connor, supra note 75, at 1238. 
 80 Rakesh Khurana & Katharina Pick, The Social Nature of Boards, 70 BROOK. L. 
REV. 1259, 1260 (2005). 
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the CEO, even when the CEO makes flawed decisions.81  CEOs 
are often blinded in their decision-making by being unable to see 
the shortcomings of plans and by being surrounded by 
individuals unwilling or unable to challenge the prevailing views 
of the CEO.82  Shareholders benefit from separating the CEO and 
chairman positions or designating a lead independent director 
because bifurcation affects structural biases and group think of 
board decision-making.  State fiduciary duty laws limit the 
ability of shareholders to address issues of structural 
organizational bias, thus, the D-F Act governance provisions, 
combined with recent SEC rulemaking disclosure, enhance 
shareholders’ rights under state corporate law, and arguably 
move federal securities laws even closer to regulating state 
corporate governance matters.83  It is noteworthy to look at how 
Delaware, the state of choice for most public corporations, 
addresses the issue of structural bias in board decision-making in 
order to gain a better understanding of the limitations and 
benefits of federal bifurcation disclosures. 
IV.  THE DELAWARE APPROACH 
Two Delaware cases, Beam v. Stewart and In re Oracle Corp 
Derivative Litigation, illustrate the issues faced by shareholders 
when trying to argue that a board or individual directors lack 
independence based on arguments of social or structural bias.84 
In Beam, the shareholder brought derivative claims against 
Martha Stewart and other officers and directors for a variety of 
actions taken by the board after allegations of insider trading 
were brought against Martha Stewart, who was chairman and 
CEO, and the largest shareholder of Martha Stewart Living 
Omnimedia, Inc. (MSO).85  It was agreed that Stewart and 
another officer were not independent or disinterested for 
 
 81 Id. at 1271.  See also James D. Cox & Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: 
Psychological Foundations and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 85–108 (1985). 
 82 Cox & Munsinger, supra note 81, at 85; Khurana & Pick, supra note 80, at 1273–
74. 
 83 Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Structural Bias, Special Litigation Committee, and the 
Vagaries of Director Independence, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1305, 1308 (discussing the meaning of 
structural bias for special litigation committees). 
 84 Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1040 (Del. Super. Ct. 2004) (“Shareholder 
brought derivative action against corporation’s founder, officers and directors, and against 
corporation as a nominal defendant, seeking relief in relation to accusations of insider 
trading by founder, private sales of sizable shares of stock by some of the directors 
following insider trading scandal, and board of director’s decision to provide founder with 
‘split-dollar’ life insurance.”); In re Oracle Corp Derivative Litigation, 824 A.2d 917, 917 
(Del. Ch. 2003) (“Shareholders brought derivative action alleging insider trading by chief 
executive officer (CEO), chief financial officer (CFO), and two directors.”). 
 85 Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d at 1044. 
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purposes of demand.86  The shareholders argued that other 
members of the board were not independent because of either 
their longstanding personal relationships with Martha Stewart, 
or their indebtedness to Stewart in some personal or professional 
manner.87  In affirming the Chancery Court’s conclusion that the 
shareholder had failed to show facts raising a reasonable doubt 
as to the independence of the named directors, the Delaware 
Supreme Court stated that the court must make a fact-specific 
determination “by answering the inquiries: independent from 
whom and independent for what purpose?  To excuse pre-suit 
demand in this case, the plaintiff has the burden to plead 
particularized facts that create a reasonable doubt sufficient to 
rebut the presumption that [the directors were] independent of 
defendant Stewart.”88  The court went on to state that the 
jurisprudence balance was to deter baseless shareholder lawsuits 
while permitting shareholders to demonstrate with 
particularized facts a lack of independence by directors.89 
The court was unwilling to find that personal friendships or 
business relationships alone result in bias enough to render a 
director incapable of exercising independent judgment.90  The 
court characterized the shareholders’ arguments as “structural 
bias” and directly stated that while it was aware of the biases 
common to boards as part of the socialization process, it was 
unwilling to take notice of such arguments unless established in 
appropriately plead complaints.91  The court acknowledged that 
the assessment of director independence varies depending on the 
state of litigation and that at the demand stage, a shareholder’s 
limited discovery on independence may be “outcome-
determinative” on the issue of independence.92 
In Oracle, a case distinguished in Beam, the court concluded 
that close personal relationships were a factor in deciding that a 
special litigation committee was not independent.93  The Oracle 
board established a Special Litigation Committee (SLC) in 
response to the derivative action filed by shareholders against 
the officers and directors.94  The SLC recommended termination 
of the litigation.95  The SLC had the burden of proof to establish 
 
 86 Id. at 1045. 
 87 Id. at 1046. 
 88 Id. at 1049–50. 
 89 Id. at 1050. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. at 1050–51.  
 92 Id. at 1055. 
 93 In re Oracle Corp Derivative Litig. 824 A.2d 917, 938 (Del. Ch. 2003). 
 94 Id. at 923. 
 95 Id. at 928. 
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that it satisfied the independence requirements set forth in 
Zapata v. Maldonado.96  Focusing on whether the SLC was 
capable of being impartial and objective in reaching its decision, 
the court analyzed the ties of two SLC directors, professors at 
Stanford University, who were asked to investigate the conduct 
of a fellow director, who also had connections to Stanford.97  The 
chairman and CEO was Lawrence Ellison, who was also a large 
contributor to Stanford.98 
The court examined the close personal relationships among 
the directors with the Stanford connections and concluded that 
there was reasonable doubt as to the independence of the SLC.99  
While acknowledging that the SLC had engaged in extensive 
work and investigation, the court concluded that the Stanford 
ties and the relationship with Ellison made the SLC directors 
beholden to Ellison even though there were no financial ties.100  
Focusing less on whether the directors were in fact dominated or 
controlled by Ellison, but rather on knowledge of human 
motivations, the court stated:  
 Delaware law should not be based on a reductionist view of human 
nature that simplifies human motivations on the lines of the least 
sophisticated notions of the law and economics movement. . . .  We 
may be thankful that an array of other motivations exist that 
influence human behavior; not all are any better than greed or 
avarice, think of envy, to name just one.  But also think of motives like 
love, friendship, and collegiality, think of those among us who direct 
their behavior as best they can on a guiding creed or set of moral 
values.101 
The court took further notice of the social behavior and 
structural biases of boards by stating, 
corporate directors are generally the sort of people deeply enmeshed 
in social institutions.  Such institutions have norms, expectations 
that, explicitly and implicitly, influence and channel the behavior of 
those who participate in their operation.  Some things are “just not 
done,” or only at a cost, which might not be so severe as a loss of 
position, but may involve a loss of standing in the institution.  In 
being appropriately sensitive to this factor, our law also cannot 
assume—absent some proof of the point—that corporate directors are, 
as a general matter, persons of unusual social bravery, who operate 
 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. at 929–36. 
 98 Id. at 932. 
 99 Id. at 942. 
 100 Id. at 925. 
 101 Id. at 938. 
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heedless to the inhibitions that social norms generate for ordinary 
folk.102  
Beam and Oracle demonstrate the different approaches 
taken by the Delaware courts in dealing with structural biases.  
In explaining the different approaches, noting the uniqueness of 
the SLC, the court in Beam writes “[u]nlike the demand-excusal 
context, where the board is presumed to be independent, the SLC 
has the burden of establishing its own independence by a 
yardstick that must be ‘like Caesar’s wife’—‘above reproach.’”103  
The court went on to state “unlike the pre-suit demand context, 
the SLC analysis contemplates not only a shift in the burden of 
persuasion but also the availability of discovery into various 
issues, including independence.”104 
When shareholders have the burden of demonstrating 
independence, they must demonstrate with particularized facts 
more than structural biases.105  When directors have the burden 
of demonstrating independence, they must demonstrate 
impartiality and courts are willing to consider structural biases 
in assessing independence.106  Delaware’s approach leaves 
shareholders at a disadvantage when structural biases limit the 
ability of shareholders to move a derivative case forward prior to 
the formation of a special litigation committee established to 
evaluate the merits of a derivative claim.107 
A. Federal Bifurcation Rules and Common Law Fiduciary Duty   
The D-F Act requirements and SEC disclosure mandates will 
require boards to evaluate and disclose its rationale for a board 
structure in which the CEO also serves as chairman of the 
board.108  In circumstances where the CEO is also the chairman, 
under SEC rules, a company is permitted to appoint a lead 
independent director.109  In such instances, company disclosures 
must define the responsibilities of the lead director.110  Requiring 
companies to disclose and explain its governance policies as it 
relates to the CEO and chairman provides shareholders with 
 
 102 Id. 
 103 Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1055 (Del. Super. Ct. 2004). 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. at 1048–49. 
 106 Id. at 1049–51. 
 107 Id. at 1054. 
 108 For an example of recent company disclosures on board leadership see 
MCDONALD’S CORP., NOTICE OF 2010 ANNUAL SHAREHOLDERS’ MEETING AND PROXY 
STATEMENT 2 (2010), available at http://www.aboutmcdonalds.com/etc/medialib/ 
aboutMcDonalds/investor_relations0.Par.34096.File.dat/2010%20mcd%20proxy.pdf. 
 109 Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, supra note 19, at 43. 
 110 Id. 
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important information on the potential for the CEO to exercise 
dominance over board decision-making. 
Delaware currently has no legislative requirements on the 
make-up of the board.  Delaware common law examines director 
independence under a duty of loyalty and a demand futility 
analysis.111  The analysis focuses on whether a director is 
interested or independent.112  In a demand futility analysis, the 
court assesses whether a director is personally interested in the 
outcome of the litigation, or whether the director benefits or 
suffers directly from the outcome of the shareholder litigation.113  
Director independence in a duty of loyalty analysis also includes 
an assessment by the court of whether the director is dominated 
by an interested director.114  In determining whether a director 
might be beholden to an interested director, Delaware courts 
have focused on whether there were financial ties between the 
directors.115  Although the burden of proof depends on whether 
the allegations of lack of director independence are at the 
demand futility or the fiduciary analysis stage of the litigation, 
Delaware relies on its business judgment rule presumption and 
enhanced judicial scrutiny of board decisions in circumstances 
when there is a conflict of interest or breach of the duty of 
loyalty.116  Provided an independent board or a committee has 
performed its duties in good faith, Delaware courts are reluctant 
to substitute its judgment for that of the board.117   
While Delaware law permits shareholders to raise issues of 
domination in the context of assessing director independence, 
Delaware’s fiduciary duty does not permit shareholders to shift 
the burden to directors to demonstrate that a board leadership 
structure in which the CEO is also chairman is not a conflict of 
interest or otherwise a breach of the duty of loyalty.118  Provided 
the directors otherwise demonstrate independence and good 
faith, the board will be entitled to the business judgment rule 
presumption.119  Delaware fiduciary law has done little to 
address directly CEO biases and domination when the CEO holds 
 
 111 See In re Tyson Foods, Inc. Consol. S’holder Litig., 919 A.2d 563, 582–83 (Del. Ch. 
2007) (discussing the Aronson test for demand futility and the test for determining 
whether a duty of loyalty claim survives a motion to dismiss); In re Oracle Derivative 
Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 939 (Del. Ch. 2003) (discussing the standards set forth in Aronson v. 
Lewis and Rales v. Blasband). 
 112 In re Tyson Foods, Inc. Consol. S’holder Litig., 919 A.2d at 582. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. 
 115 In re Oracle Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d at 936. 
 116 In re Tyson Foods, Inc. Consol. S’holder Litig., 919 A.2d at 582. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id. at 584. 
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both positions.120  With improved federal disclosures on why a 
CEO holds dual positions or appointment of independent lead 
director, investors can evaluate structural biases in board 
decision-making.121  More importantly, it is the opportunity for 
directors to more fully account for the effects of group think on 
board decision-making by understanding what social science data 
reveals about how decisions are made in groups.122 
B. Bifurcation:  The Benefit to Shareholders  
Prior to passage of the D-F Act and SEC rules on bifurcation, 
shareholders had limited information on board leadership and 
structural bias.123  Federal rules requiring disclosures of board 
leadership structure benefit shareholders by not only providing 
better information on board structure, but also by requiring 
directors to assess its board structure for structural biases and 
independence.124  Engaging in a review of its board leadership 
structure improves directors’ fiduciary obligations by ensuring 
independent directors are able to engage in frank discord without 
undue management influences.125  Although companies are not 
required to separate the CEO and chairman’s job, by forcing 
disclosures, the board must at least engage in an analysis of how 
its board structure works.126  Separating the role of the CEO and 
chairman improves corporate governance by recognizing the 
social dynamic of board interaction in ways state fiduciary 
analysis does not.127  Having the board justify its leadership 
structure also benefits shareholders in situations where 
shareholder derivative claims for breach of fiduciary limit the 
ability of shareholders to use discovery to uncover structural 
biases.128  Shareholders may be better able to demonstrate 
demand futility when the board has disclosed its rationale for a 
leadership structure that does not separate the roles of chairman 
and CEO. 
 
 120 Langevoort, supra note 76, at 289–91 (discussing capture and the balance of power 
between the board and CEO); Paredes, supra note 79, at 724–25 (discussing how 
Delaware corporate law provides that the “[t]he business and affairs of every 
corporation . . . shall be managed by or under the direction of [the] board of directors,” and 
thus the CEO has control because the board delegates it to him). 
 121 Joseph McCafferty, Splitting the CEO and the Chair, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK 
(June 12, 2009, 2:08 PM), http://www.businessweek.com/managing/content/jun2009/ 
ca20090612_359612.htm. 
 122 See supra note 85, and accompanying text. 
 123 Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, supra note 19, at 4. 
 124 Id. at 4–5. 
 125 Id. at 43–44. 
 126 Id. at 44. 
 127 McCafferty, supra note 121. 
 128 Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, supra note 19, at 44. 
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Bifurcation disclosure requirements are a positive benefit for 
state corporate governance.  Until state corporate law, in 
particular Delaware, begins to reexamine its rules on board 
structure, federal securities laws are likely to continue to 
legislate disclosure requirements to address issues of board 
group think in decision-making.  Bifurcation of the CEO and 
Chairman moves a bit closer to blurring the complementary 
balance between federal and state law on governance. 
CONCLUSION 
In 2003, Professor Roe129 wrote an article in which he argued 
that the real competition in corporate governance was not 
between Delaware and other states, but between Delaware and 
federal securities laws.130  I agree with Professor Roe’s 
observation.  Federal rules continue to use disclosure mandates 
to affect behavior of corporate managers in their relationship 
with shareholders.  The politics of responding to corporate crises 
is unlikely to see Congress or the SEC limit its role in effecting 
corporate governance changes for the public corporation.  
Congress sought to address specific corporate failures in the D-F 
Act—governance failures such as highly paid executive 
compensation in the wake of corporate failures, compensation 
committees rewarding executives for taking excessive risk, and 
directors seemingly unwilling to engage in critical analysis of the 
CEO or management’s decisions.131 
Do the new federal disclosure requirements on corporate 
governance benefit shareholders under state law?  I believe the 
short answer to this question is yes; however, I am not convinced 
that the disclosure requirements can achieve improvements in 
board leadership without a corresponding shift in state corporate 
governance.  The new rules will force the boards of public 
companies to engage in greater oversight of risk and disclose 
such risk.  More importantly, the disclosures on board leadership 
structure will likely increase the overall independence of the 
board, allowing for improvements in frank discussion among 
board members.  Where state fiduciary duty does not address or, 
as in Delaware, varies depending on the stage of shareholder 
litigation, shareholders are likely to face litigation disadvantages 
in a demand futility analysis for independence.  State fiduciary 
 
 129 Professor Mark Roe is a noted scholar, who writes in the areas of corporate law 
and governance.  He is the author of Strong Managers Weak Owners: The Political Roots 
of American Corporate Finance.  Professor Roe is currently a professor at Harvard Law 
School. 
 130 Roe, supra note 4, at 592. 
 131 McCafferty, supra note 121. 
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duty analysis will continue to be supplemented by federal rules of 
disclosures.  As Congress responds to specific corporate failures, 
state corporate law can respond to investor concerns with a more 
methodological, nuanced analysis of corporate conduct.  Courts 
will respect good faith efforts by independent boards, and 
shareholders can be informed of how compensation committees 
and their consultants make their decisions.  Boards who have an 
independent source of information with new rules on 
compensation consultants will continue to have the protection of 
business judgment rule.  So in the end, notwithstanding federal 
laws’ increasing push on state corporate law, the complimentary 
balance of federal and state law remains. 
 
 
 
